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TAXATION OF GOVERNMENT BONDHOLDERS AND EMPLOYEES. THE IMMUNITY
RULE AND THE SIXTEENTH AMENDMENT. A Study by the Department of
Justice. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1938. Pp. xi, 219.
Supplemented by an Appendix in Ninety-five Sections.
IN the review of this same Study in the February, 1939 issue of the YALE
LAW JOURNAL, the reviewer stated:
"Well, I haven't read the Department of Justice's 219-page report on
taxation of government bondholders and employees, entitled 'The Immunity
Rule and the Sixteenth Amendment.' I haven't read it because I know pretty
well what's in it without reading it . . . I'm sure that anyone who knows
anything about income tax law also knows pretty well what that report
contains. Or could find out the way I found out. I did read the table of
contents." 1
But the writer of that review was in error. The Study, and the Appendix
incorporated into it by frequent references, have a great deal of information
and argument not indicated by the brief table of contents, and much of this
material was new to the present reviewer, who is familiar with the United
States income tax law.
The Study is addressed by the Department of Justice to the General Counsel
of the Treasury Department in support of the president's recommendation
that income hitherto held immune be subjected to income tax. The Study is
divided into two Parts; the first dealing with the tax immunity doctrine of
the United States Supreme Court, without reference to the Sixteenth Amend-
ment; the second with the effect, if any, of the Sixteenth Amendment on the
immunity 'question.
Part I contains an exhaustive and logical marshalling of the decisions of
the United States Supreme Court bearing in any way on the question of
whether or not the first Pollock case 2 holding interest from state and munici-
pal bonds exempt from federal income tax, is still authoritative. The con-
clusion reached is that, even apart from the Sixteenth Amendment, it is not.
This portion of the Study also makes out a strong, but to me unpersuasive,
case for the novel argument, suggested by the opinion in Hclvering v. Ger-
hart,3 that the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity is not necessarily
bilateral; that the immunity from tax of instrumentalities of the states may
be more restricted than that of instrumentalities of the Federal Government.
Another important and original contribution is the able analysis of the deci-
sions in numerous Canadian and Australian cases dealing with questions of
intergovernmental tax immunity similar to those which have arisen in the
United States, showing that after an initial tendency to establish a doctrine
of governmental immunity, the courts have, in recent years, almost completely
wiped out every non-statutory exemption of private persons from non-dis-
criminatory taxes.
1. (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 710.
2. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429 (1895).
3. 304 U. S. 405 (1938).
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Part II and the portion of the Appendix bearing on this part contain a
comprehensive history of the genesis of the Si-teenth Amendment and of the
decisions of the Supreme Court bearing on the construction of the Amend-
ment. This part makes out a convincing case in support of the view that
one of the purposes of the Sixteenth Amendment was to overcome the effect
of the decisions in Collector v. Day,4 and the first Pollock case, and give the
Federal Government power to impose an income tax on the salaries of all
state employees and holders of municipal bonds. Two of the most notable
contributions to this view are in Sections 36 and 46 of the Appendix. The
first is that, while the proposed Sixteenth Amendment was before the state
legislatures, not only Governor Charles Evans Hughes of New York publicly
expressed the opinion that the proposed Sixteenth Amendment appeared to
give Congress power to tax the salaries of state officers and the interest on
state bonds (an opinion well-known to those familiar with the federal income
tax law), but that the other great lawyer-governor of the day - former Chief
Justice Simeon E. Baldwin of Connecticut - gave a similar opinion in his
message to the Connecticut Legislature of January 4, 1911. The second is
that on April 11, 1910, six of the ablest and best-known lawyers of New York
-Joseph H. Choate, William D. Guthrie, Victor Morawetz, Austen G. Fox,
John G. Milburn and Francis Lynde Stetson - submitted a memorandum to
the Legislature of New York, giving their unqualified opinion that the pro-
posed Sixteenth Amendment would empower the Federal Government to
impose income taxes on the salaries of state officers and the interest derived
from state bonds.
ly only criticism of this masterly Study is its failure to make clear that
the Department of justice does not take the extreme position that Congress
has power to impose an income tax on the tax revenues of the states. In the
absence of an express disclaimer on this point, some of the arguments ad-
vanced in the Study are open to the construction that as long as Congress
refrains from imposing a heavier tax on state revenue than it imposed on
individual incomes, such a tax would be constitutional. Presumably the
Department of justice holds no such view, and the Study would have becn
less vulnerable if a paragraph had been inserted in the Introduction or
Conclusion making this dear.
In closing I think it worth while to point out the error and injustice of
the concluding point made in the earlier review. After asserting that, under
the President's recommendation, "one type of government income" would
still be free from federal income tax, the reviewer said:
"The lone type of income thus left immune would be none other than the
salaries of federal judges, including the Honorable members of the Supreme
Court. And those salaries were put out of the reach of the federal tax
collector by a Supreme Court decision far more flagrant in its distortion of
the Constitution than Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co. or Collector
v. Day.
"Maybe the omission was an oversight. Maybe. Still, I can't help wonder-
ing whether that oversight won't carry more weight with certain members
of the Court than 219 pages-worth of legal argument."r
4. 11 Wall. 113 (U. S. 1870).
5. (1939) 48 YAL L. J. 710, 711.
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The fact, of course, is that the President omitted any reference to the
salaries of federal judges, because Congress had already provided in the
Revenue Act of 1932 (continued in the 1934, 1936 and 1938 Acts) that the
salaries of all federal judges appointed after June 6, 1932, be subject to federal
income tax, so that that particular immunity had previously been taken care
of; and when the constitutionality of this earlier provision came before the
Supreme Court in O'Malley v. Woodrough,6 all but one of the justices,




THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMMUNITY OF STATE AND MUNICIPAL SECURITIES. A
Legal Defense of The Continued Integrity of the Fiscal Powers of the
States. By the Attorneys General of the States and Counsel for Certain
of their Municipal Subdivisions. Privately Printed, 1939. Pp. iv, 420.
Supplemented by a Report to the Comptroller of the State of New York
by Professor Harley L. Lutz, entitled THE FISCAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTs
OF THE TAXATION OF PUBLIC SECURITIES.
THIS Defense is a reply to the Study of the Department of justice which
has just been reviewed. It is addressed to Congress and presents a survey
of the present sweep towards centralization and an impressive warning
against its dangers, as well as a discussion of legal principles. The sup-
porting document, the Report of Professor Lutz, is an economic study, the
most notable feature of which is an effort to show that if Congress should
impose a tax on the income from state (including municipal) securities, this
would cost the states "a minimum of $ii3,ooo,ooo annually in increased
interest cost" against an estimated increase in yield of federal income tax
of only $95,000,000 a year. While this 241-page report reflects a vast amount
of research, I am unconvinced by its major point. I think the imposition of
existing progressive rates of federal surtax on state and municipal bonds
hereafter issued would almost certainly produce a revenue to the Federal
Government in excess of any forseeable increase in interest cost to the states.
Turning to the legal aspects of the Defense, the Attorneys-General have
said, and effectively said, practically everything that can be marshalled in
favor of their position. The most pungent part of the Defense is its assump-
tion that the Department of Justice Study upholds the view that the Federal
Government has power to tax the revenues of the state and its subdivisions
and its demonstration of the revolutionary and destructive results that would




result from the Federal Government's exercise of such a power. The Defense
also powerfully, and I think successfully, combats the Department's conten-
tion that the immunities of the Federal Government from state taxation are
wider than those of the states from federal taxation.
But the argument on the major question of the constitutionality of the
President's recommendation in favor of a federal income tax on the salaries
of state (including municipal) employees and interest on state bonds is "ot
convincing. It contains an exhaustive survey of the Supreme Court decisions,
indicating that such a tax would be unconstitutional, but, to ny mind, fails
to make out a logical or persuasive case against the Department of Justice's
position that the earlier decisions should not be followed.
Since the Defense was published, the Supreme Court has passed on a
question of the immunity of the salaries of government employees in Graves
v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe,' and has sustained the constitutionality of the
New York income tax imposing a tax on the salary of an employee of the
United States Home Owners' Loan Corporation. The decision is of basic
importance, because a majority of the Court ignored the possibility of putting
the decision on the narrow point that the corporation was a proper but not
essential agency of the Federal Government, and placed it on the broad
bottom that a non-discriminatory tax by one government on the salaries of
employees of the other is constitutional; expressly siver-ruling Collector T%
Day2 and NVc-, York c.r rcl. Rogers v. Graves "so far as they recognize an
implied immunity from income taxation of the salaries of officers or employees
of the national or state government or their instrumentalities." 3
The question of the taxability of the interest from state and municipal bonds
remains undecided. But the case for the immunity of such income is even
weaker than that for the immunity of these salaries, because the told and
long successful argument for immunity, that the power to tax is the po wer
to destroy, is weaker in the case of government bond interest than in the
case of government salaries. The state and municipal governments could
not function at all without employees, but they obviously could function,
however imperfectly, without resort to further burrowing. Congress has
not yet adopted the President's recommendation for a tax on the salaries
ot state employees and state bond interest, but if and when it dIes, the Act




1. 306 U. S. 466 (1939).
2. 11 Wall. 113 (U. S. 1870).
3. 306 U. S. 466, 486 (1939).
*Librarian, Yale University.
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READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE. Selected, edited and arranged by Jerome Hall.
Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1938. Pp. 1183.
SEVERAL noteworthy attempts have been made to introduce to the student,
through selected readings, the philosophic conceptions of law and judicial
process;1 but Professor Hall's is, perhaps, the most ambitious and the most
satisfactory.
One cannot say that there is a widespread interest in the philosophy of
law today; kings are not philosophers, and philosophers are not kings, so
what can one expect of the poor devils who are, or are preparing to be, mere
lawyers, the simple hewers of wood? I think, however, that it is a fact that
there are more people today than there were in pre-depression days who are
trying to create an interest in - and market for - this precious article.
There are several reasons for this phenomenon. In the first place, there
is a brooding presence of melancholy that pervades our classrooms these
days. Law students do not feel that they stand tip-toe before a Great Adven-
ture; they do not hear the mad words of a great Law-Giver, perhaps because
there is no golden calf to make or break; they are disenchanted; and when
the shop-keepers' sons need to share their fathers' worries, sometimes their
minds become susceptible to stray thoughts about Higher Things- Some
people, when they cannot get what they want, are at times led to ask them-
selves if the thing has really an intrinsic worth, and by slow steps they may
be led even to speculate about a General Theory of Value. It is an old
story, more ancient than Stoicism and more modern than Instrumentalism:
when a fellow is unhappy, when he is uneasy, when he is not sure of his
footing or prospect, he thinks. As far as I have been able to observe, there
is little enough genuine, sustained interest in jurisprudence on the part of
students. But they are more receptive today than they were in happier days.
In the second place, a handful of law teachers have turned to Higher
Criticism as a reaction to the positivism which is still the only respectable
position a self-respecting professor dare avow. This small congregation of
protestants are surfeited with the meats and sweet-meats of bills and notes,
implied warranties, insurance policies and perpetuities; they turn to the locusts
and wild honey of natural law, analytical jurisprudence, legal method and
sociology.
With the students, legal philosophy is a matter of mood; with the teachers,
it is a matter of taste. At the present there are enough teachers with a taste
for the subject, and just enough students in the mood for it, to make the
appearance of Professor Hall's book an event to be noted.
I have had good proof of this in the eating. For the first term of the school
year 1938-1939 I conducted my graduate seminar in Legal Method without
1. COHEN, M. R. AND COHEN, F. S., SELECTED READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW (1930); Wu AND LIANG, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPnY (un-
dated); GAviT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS (1936) ; BENSON AND FRYER, READINGS ON THE STUDY OF LAW AND THE ANGLO-
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (1937). Mention might be made also of two books in the
MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY SERIES: SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD (1917), and RATIoAL
BASIS OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (1923); also POUND AND PLUCENrr, READINGS ON TInE
HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMON LAw (3d ed. 1927).
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the use of a book; for the second term Hall's book was available and was
assigned to the students (with special emphasis on seven of the tventy-five
chapters, viz., Logic and Law, Analogy, Formal Science, Science and Scien-
tific Method, General Theory of an Empirical Science of Law, Legislation
and Social Problems, and Judicial Process). My attitude was naturally
experimental, and I am glad to report to my colleagues that the experiment
was successful.
I judge the success from two standpoints; namely, the teacher's interest
in the material as central points for lectures and discussions, and the student's
interest in the material as outline and stimulus. Professor Hall's book meets
both these tests.
As to the substance of the book, consideration needs to be given to the
following three matters: the materials selected, the materials omitted, and
the arrangement of the materials. Judgment of these matters is, naturally,
largely subjective, determined by nuances of thought and overtones of feeling
concerning subjects which lack, and will continue to Ick, definitive structure;
for jurisprudence is a subject rich in articulated detail, but making up a
configuration as arbitrary and as personal as the man who teaches it.
As to the materials selected, one might say that there is too much of a
good thing. A student can be exposed to jurisprudence for only a term or
two; in so short a time the most- and best- that can be accomplished is
to have awakened the students from their dogmatic slumbers. To make of
them scholars in the field is to expect too much (and may be undesirable).
An over-abundance of materials may also confuse the student, so that he
will see the trees but no forest. I, for one, would be very happy if I could.
for instance, convey to students the position of Cicero and Aquinas on natural
law without complicating the subject by a study of the views of others; for
the important thing is not so much to take students into the garden and
make them acquainted with all its vegetation, as it is to open windows for
them, and perhaps now and then a door. But Professor Hall gives us five
pages from Cicero and thirteen from Aquinas, and about sixty-five pages
more from Plato, Aristotle, Windelband, Maine, Saint Germain, Suarez,
Grotius, Hobbes, Burlamaqui, Rutherforth, Blackstone, Lorimer, Miltner and
Hill. As a result, the teacher cannot assign the book in olo; he must refine
the editor's method and make a selection from the materials selected. He
has, however, this consolation: he will not often need to go outside of the
book for materials of high quality.
This brings us to a consideration of the second matter, i.e., materials
omitted. The book is by no means a thesaurus; but nothing of pedagogic
importance has been left out. It is, however, true that some important things
(e.g., Frank, Goodhart, Dickinson) have been shortened to such an extent
that the selections are practically useless, and the student must be referred
to the originals. If the book had fewer selections, perhaps those included
would be set forth more generously; on the other hand there is the danger
that some teachers would then be in a position to say that the book consists
of inferior materials adequately reprinted. Professor Hall has certainly
avoided the latter charge, but not without paying a price: the book is as
cold and impersonal as an encyclopedia. Leon Green and Karl Llewellyn
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have shown us that a book of cases and materials can be adequate and yet,
in a sense, personal. A demonstration of this should be easier in Professor
Hall's field than in the law of torts or sales.
As to the arrangement: in jurisprudence it might be said that no matter
where one begins, one will find himself in ntedias res. Jurisprudence, in rela-
tion to the law, like metaphysics in relation to the sciences, undertakes to
consider, as Aristotle would say, "the first things." But what things are first
among first things?
Hall has divided his book into three parts: Philosophy of Law, Analytical
Jurisprudence, and Law and Social Science. Under the first heading the
selections relate to Natural Law, Historical Jurisprudence, Transcendental
Idealism, Utilitarianism, Social Functionalism, Pragmatism, Further Aspects
of the Conflict between Empiricism and Idealism, and Idealism in the Judicial
Process. The second part consists of chapters on Logic and Law, Nature
of Law, Terminology and Basic Concepts, Syllogism, Analogy, Classification,
and Formal Science. The last part is devoted to Science and Scientific Method,
Nature of Social Science, General Theory of an Empirical Science of Law,
Primitive Law, Law and Custom, Social and Legal Institutions, Social
Control - Legal and Non-Legal, Legislation and Social Problems, Judicial
Process, and Methods of Research.
A teacher of jurisprudence must determine for himself which is the cart
and which is the horse, and put first things first; and no hvo teachers will
agree in their orders - which is as it should be, for this freedom from
spatial and temporal orders makes it possible for the teacher to be at least
formally creative.
Professor Hall has given us the cloth. The teacher will cut it according
to his own pattern and the size of his students- those few students who
can make of their law studies a spiritual quest, those rare young men who,
like Thoreau, are still on the trail of a hound, a bay horse, and a turtle-dove,
which they feel they lost a long time ago.
MILToN R. KONVITZt
New York City.
MONEY IN THE LAW. By Arthur Nussbaum. Chicago: The Foundation
Press, 1939. Pp. 515.
PERSONS interested in monetary problems have long awaited this book.
A series of articles on various aspects of the law of money had forecast its
appearance. The author's seminar on the subject, conducted at Columbia
University, indicated his continued interest in the field. His earlier writings
had already demonstrated his complete command of the materials. WAre now
have the result of many years of intensive work. A large book - 515 pages
- but extraordinarily compact, an amazing store of information, ideas, and
comment, rigorously analysed.
1Lecturer in Law, New York University.
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The emphasis is on law rather than economics, and on American law
primarily. In both respects it fills an important gap. Even in the abundant
literature of foreign countries the legal aspects of money had by no means
been fully explored; it was chiefly from Professor Nussbaum's own earlier
writings that one could secure guidance and illumination. In the United
States there was no comprehensive treatment to be found at all, in spite of
the legal and political controversies that have raged on monetary questions
through most of our history. Most readers will be astonished to discover
how much American "law" there is on the subject. As he points out in his
preface, the United States provides a remarkable laboratory of monetary
experiments and an enormous body of statutory and case law, much of which
is here analysed for the first time.
Fortunately, the emphasis on American law has not restricted the range of
his investigations. The present book is not primarily a treatise on economic
theory. But it restates for American readers, without extended argument,
the economic analysis which had already appeared in the author's earlier
writings and which had given him an important position in the field of
economic theory. His views were of course well known to specialists, partly
through translation into other languages, but it is likely that they had not
received the attention in this country that they deserve. In this book they
are applied in detail to a variety of legal problems and to new types of mone-
tary phenomena.
On broader issues of economic theory Professor Nussbaum adopts the
position commonly described as "nominalist." His careful analysis of this
general position should do much to clarify reasoning in this country on legal
problems concerned with money. There are few areas in which law, and
economics are so completely interwoven or in which primitive conceptions
of economic theory have persisted so long and played such havoc with legal
reasoning. Through all the ramifications of his argument the author draws
freely on economic analysis to illuminate legal problems. At the same time
he demonstrates repeatedly and convincingly that results actually reached by
legal agencies reflect - sometimes unconsciously - an economic theory con-
sistent with his own.
Within the general area of "nominalism," of course, there remain numerous
subsidiary issues on which theoretical debate still continues. For the purpwqes
of this book it is of course unnecessary to elaborate his position on most of
these issues. He chiefly concentrates his attack on the so-called "state"
theory of money developed by Knapp. To it he opposes his own "society"
theory, in which the functioning of money is attributed in the last analysis
to social and psychological factors. His views on this question are suggestive
not only in the field of monetary problems but on broader problems of legal
and economic theory. Consistently with this main thesis, he lays great em-
phasis throughout the book on social practices and conduct. One of the most
remarkable features of the book is its vivid and realistic picture of the functions
in contemporary life of the innumerable monetary practices described.
Even more important than the contribution to economic theory and the
accumulation of factual data is the extraordinary wealth of reference to foreign
law. The comparative treatment that appears so prominently in Professor
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Nussbaum's other work is here brought to its fullest development. It is
obvious that few fields can yield such fruitful results to comparative study
as the law and contemporary practices relating to money. International
boundaries lose most of their significafice in this area. On this aspect of the
subject there is probably no one now alive who could have presented so rich
a collection of important and suggestive material. His keen awareness of
historical factors is combined with a complete command of foreign literature
and an ability to draw on the legal sources of every important country in the
modern world.
The first chapter of the book is devoted to an analysis of basic monetary
conceptions. Here appear not only the main statement of Professor Nuss-
baum's economic views but a brief account of the position of money in the
legal system as a whole. He next proceeds to a descriptive account of the
kinds of money that have been employed at various stages of economic
development, with a close analysis of the legal implications involved at each
stage. A brief account of the structure of modern monetary systems is then
followed by a detailed account of the American system, from colonial times
to the present day. The rest of the book is devoted to the general subject
of debts, including the effect on debts of fluctuations in purchasing power,
the problems connected with debts payable in foreign currencies, and the
effects of recent governmental interference with international payments
through exchange control. The later sections are much concerned with in-
tricate problems in conflict of laws that are raised in a variety of forms.
Here the author is able to employ to great advantage the skill and learning
already shown in his comprehensive treatment on conflict of laws.
Perhaps the most interesting passages for the general reader are contained
in the description (pp. 185-211) of the complex and confusing monetary
system now employed in this country. As the author points out, it reflects
the combination in American psychology of a profound respect for tradition
with a readiness for free experiment. The silver-purchase policy is closely
analysed for its effects on the basic elements of the American system, and
some forcible criticisms are presented. Still more interesting is the conclusion
that the tendency to concentrate monetary control in the hands of the Govern-
ment has proceeded further here than anywhere else in the world, not except-
ing the countries now subject to political dictatorship.
The discussion of the famous Portuguese bank note case (pp. 93-99) is
remarkable for the light that it throws on a case that had already provoked
interminable discussion. The case was unique, as Professor Nussbaum points
out, in that the forgery of the Portuguese bank notes in that case had pro-
duced "an inflationary injection in a perfectly anaesthetic patient." -le demon-
strates convincingly that the House of Lords, like most of the persons dis-
cussing the case, failed to grasp the economic factors really involved. I-Ie
leaves one with the feeling that lawyers were there confronted with an
economic problem that was not only too subtle and complex for their com-
prehension, but which legal agencies could not fully solve even with the aid
of advanced economic technique.
In the extended review of the effects of monetary depreciation, Professor
Nussbaum reiterates his criticisms, earlier expressed, of the revaluation move-
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ment in Germany after the great post-war inflation. He concedes, as before,
that neither the nominalist principle nor the policies which it reflects need
exclude adjustment by courts of debts which he describes as "adaptable"-
e.g., claims for damages for tort or breach of contract. The criticisms of the
German attempt to judicial revaluation are concentrated on the area of
"liquidated" debts, and emphasize the confusion and waste inevitably accom-
panying the process, the arbitrary standards necessarily employed. With all
this one can fully agree, though the question would still remain whether
confusion and arbitrary choice of standards would not characterize legisla-
tion to at least the same degree. A person trained in American legal technique
would be inclined to part company with Professor Nussbaum only where he
abandons the plane of convenience and practicability, and introduces theoreti-
cal reasons for restricting the judicial function in preference for legislative
action. Fundamental issues of legal method are here involved, on which
training and experience produce an important difference in emphasis.
It is in fact extremely interesting to observe how a supremely competent
European lawyer employs the materials of Anglo-American law.' The entire
subject of the law of money is one which requires a clear and rigorous
analysis but in which, on the contrary, vagueness and confusion have hitherto
prevailed. It is precisely this quality of clear and rigorous analysis that is
apt to impress an American reader. The formidable learning shown through-
out the book is one that the author is uniquely qualified to supply. Quite
apart from this, however, I doubt whether many American lawyers could
have written such a book. There appear in it a penetrating realism, a lively
sense of social and psychological phenomena, a piling up of concrete and
illuminating detail. In all these respects the book is far indeed from the
dogmatic school of earlier German writing. There remains, however, a
fundamental reliance on the "clear-cut juridical thought" which is implicit
through the book and which the author at one point (p.293) explicitly
demands. We still have much to learn from the methods he employs. We have
lost faith in such methods lately, partly because they had been used so much
by American lawyers without insight and perspective, without a sense of
the complexity of social phenomena and the relativity of legal techniques.
Our distrust may also be due to the knowledge that our courts respond less
and less to the methods of systematic analysis, as sources of doctrine are
multiplied and the creativeness of the judicial function is increasingly recog-
nized. One can lay aside the question whether we can ever achieve (or
whether it is worth while to achieve) an intelligible "system" of American
law. Nevertheless, for the purposes of scientific study it is still true that a
large place remains for imaginative generalization, systematically pursued but
enriched by the widest observation. This book demonstrates how much insight
and clarification can be gained for American law from a European scholar
who has fortunately been enabled to devote his unique talents and equipment
to its dispersed materials.
JonN P. DwNso.N-
Ann Arbor, lichigan.
j Professor of Law, Michigan University.
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CASES ON CODE PLEADING. Second Edition. By Archibald Hall Throck-
morton. St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1938. Pp. xxiii, 756.
THE author states in his preface that the second edition has been reduced
in size to provide materials for a three-semester-hour course. Apart from
the reduction in size the only change made in the organization of the book
or of the subject-matter covered is the omission of a separate chapter oil
motions, which is covered in this edition by a brief text statement in con-
nection with the chapter on the demurrer.
To a considerable extent the materials found in the first edition have been
retained in the second edition, although a number of recent cases have been
substituted for older cases and the notes have been brought down to date
with references to the more recent cases and law review materials. The
new Federal Rules on Civil Procedure have been copied in full in the appendix
and reference has been made throughout the book to the Illinois Civil Prac-
tice Act.
Undoubtedly the casebook constitutes a thorough revision of the earlier
edition. The scholarship of the author constitutes a guarantee that the
materials have been carefully selected. An instructor interested in the tra-
ditional course in Code Pleading certainly will find the book a very fine tool
for such a course.
It occurs to me that a valid criticism of the book must be based on the
objective and content of the course it is designed to serve. After some con-
siderable experience in teaching in this field I have become convinced that
it is a rather serious mistake to give separate courses in Pleading and Practice.
If two separate courses are given there is necessarily a considerable amount
of repetition and no real opportunity offered or taken to present the law
of procedure in its larger aspects; if only the course in Pleading is given
a considerable body of procedural law which is important and perhaps more
difficult than the law of pleading is omitted. The traditional course in Code
Pleading is much too narrow and it over-emphasizes a few of the rules in
that field. It constitutes to a very considerable extent a course in substantive
law, to the exclusion of a significant treatment of procedural technics as such.
Thus, for example, in this casebook the first 386 pages are devoted to the
questions of parties, the joinder and splitting of causes of action, and the
substance of the complaint in various types of situations. The code rules on
those subjects are stated in terms of the substantive law background, and in
my experience the accepted interpretations of those rules can very adequately
be presented in a rather brief time. While it may be very helpful to the
student to go over large portions of the substantive law involved in the vary-
ing applications of those rules, such a practice constitutes primarily a splendid
review for the student of his substantive courses. A lawyer who knows the
generalities of those rules will have little difficulty in applying them to specific
situations and if he should make a mistake the further rules on amendment
and waiver of procedural defects make the mistake relatively unimportant.
What a lawyer needs to know most intimately and with certainty about
procedure are the various procedural techniques available in'properly raising
jurisdictional, substantive, and procedural points. The law of procedure
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imposes this obligation on the parties and normally provides an exclusive
procedure on a given point. Thus it seems to me to be a serious mistake to
omit the chapter on motions. The modem tendency is to increase their use
to the exclusion of demurrers and pleas. Their form and purpose is of
primary importance to one who expects to engage in the practice of law.
Of immediate interest to the practicing lawyer also is the problem of the
practical effect of not raising jurisdictional, substantive, and procedural points
in the light of consistent tendency to provide for the waiver of questions not
properly raised; and a thorough knowledge of the rules governing the privi-
leges of amendments and substitutions. On this latter problem the present
casebook contains materials covering only 35 pages and on the former problem,
apart from the materials on the splitting of a cause of action, the materials
cover only 6 pages. I am sure that the real importance of those subject-
matters requires a more extended treatment of them.
The conclusion is that an instructor who likes the type of course in Plead-
ing for which this casebook was designed will find the book a very competent
tool. But one who has in mind a course in Procedure which would deal with
Procedure in its larger aspects, and which would emphasize the rules on the
accepted procedural technics besides the practical result of the violations of
those rules, will find it quite inadequate.
BERNARD C. GriT
Bloomington, Indiana.
ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS OF PROFIT. By Stephen Gilman. New York: The
Ronald Press, 1939. Pp. v, 611. $5.00.
TRUTH IN ACCOUNTING. By Kenneth MacNeal. Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1939. Pp. xii, 324. $3.50.
TEE economic crisis of recent years has brought with it a great deal of
criticism of traditional ideas and methods, as well as proposals for change.
The field of accounting is one in which changes have been most actively
discussed, not only by irate outsiders, but also by puzzled practitioners of the
profession. The natural tendencies in this direction, which would in any case
have followed the crashing of many business dreams, have been intensified
by the creation of governmental agencies. Their activities are making neces-
sary the defense or alteration of many accounting conventions that would have
been considered sacrosanct a decade ago. As is the custom in such circum-
stances, the critics have agreed that present practices should be changed, but
their positive proposals lumped together advise the accountant to proceed
rapidly in all directions.
The two books under review typify the similarities and differences to be
found in the literature of reform. They agree that present methods are not
IDean, Indiana University School of Law.
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ideal, though MacNeal in this respect, as in most others, is more pugnacious.
He says:
"Under present conditions a full, honest disclosure of the facts in a set of
financial statements is most improbable. If the management of a company
desired such disclosure its accountant would in all probability feel compelled
to refuse to certify the figures." (because the accountant would refuse to
recognize unrealized profits.)'
Gilman's conclusion is phrased more cautiously:
"It is somewhat ironic that true accounting profits may be determined for
• . . evanescent ventures while the same simple and accurate determination
• . . is utterly impossible for the large, well-managed corporation with in-
definite life tenure."
2
In their treatment of the problem, their proposals for change, and their
style of presentation, the two books are far apart. MacNeal is the pamphleteer.
His chapters abound with such combative words as "untrue," "futile," "dis-
honest," and the like. While this treatment challenges tie reader's attention,
it causes an unfavorable reaction to the author's positive proposals, which,
although most controversial, are put in as uncompromising manner as his
criticisms. Gilman is ever the cautious, thorough, academician. He has ex-
amined all the literature, and by superabundant quotation and reference keeps
the reader more informed of what others have said than of what lie himself
has concluded. In fact, the first eleven chapters seem redundant, and could
be skipped by most readers. The remainder of the work, while pedestrian
in style, is of greater interest, though more readable discussions could probably
be found elsewhere. However, no such encyclopedic canvassing of recent
literature is to be found in other works. Gilman himself has supplied the
lack he has observed:
"It is as though each accountant felt that while he himself had never taken
the time nor the trouble to make an actual list of accounting principles, lie
was comfortably certain that some-one else had done so." 3
The conclusions of the two authors can best be contrasted by stating their
attitudes toward the content of periodic statements. The dissimilarity is not
to be found in the general form of the statements, for the books are as one
in recommending full disclosure of balance sheets, income statements and
surplus adjustments, and their classifications of items are not unlike, The
difference is found in the bases for the evaluation of assets. Gilman calls for
the continuance of cost values for all useful assets. For example, he denies
the common accounting convention that inventories should be stated at the
lower of cost or market values, a practice which lie considers "distorting and
unconservative" (p. 434). As to fixed assets, Gilman goes so far in his
advocacy of the maintenance of cost values that he nearly states that the
accountant should accept any valuation once placed on the books. He says:
"Strictly as an accounting matter, asset revaluation is meaningless. Con-
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lacNeal believes that every asset should be stated at current market value
as of the date of the statement. He asserts:
"It seems clear that balance sheets, prepared on the basis of present econ-
omic values, would supply to . . .groups at interest information of more
value than [that] with which they are now supplied."5
Such market values, he believes, can be obtained more easily than most people
would suppose. Even complicated capital assets can be evaluated quite easily
by an appraiser. Several chapters are devoted to an elaboration of desirable
ways of finding market values, or imputing them. These values are to be
found as of the date of the statement, although one should not assume that
the assets in question would be forced on the market.
"The value of a thing is not what it could be sold for if it were offered
for sale. Its value is what it is being bought and sold for, or if it is nut
being bought and sold, its logical price under the ratio of supply and demand
that actually exists."0
Again:
"Supply and demand constantly tend to equalize, and .. .if one is lmown
the other is pretty close to being lnown.'7
La xyers and economists who have struggled over some matter of valuation
will find MacNeal's confidence in appraisals and appraisers worse than naive.
The contrasting conclusions flow naturally from the authors' varied ideas
of the purpose of accounting. Gilman emphasizes that modern business can
be compared to a medieval "venture," which took place within one accounting
period. Capital was invested; ships and cargo were purchased; a voage was
made, and the returned ship and its cargo all sold before the accounts were
closed and the profit or loss determined. Such a profit or loss was definite,
and was the difference between the capital invested at the start and the capital
returned at the end of the venture. If an accountant had attempted to prepare
statements during the venture, he would have had to estimate values for the
unsold ship and goods, thus making impossible precise determination of
profits.
In dealing with present problems of accounting, Gilman places great weight
on the contention that business is still a venture, for which the accountant
should ultimately determine whether or not the original capital has been
returned. In the meantime, the periodic statements should show what progress
has been made in this direction. The return of the original cost, therefore,
is the basis on which accounting profit is to be determined. All proposals
to revalue assets, whether for conservative or other reasons, should he frowned
upon.
It is a natural result of this attitude that Gilman should think of accounting
as a profession somewhat removed from the bustle of the business world. He
queries whether "reporting" is not, after all, a profession separate from
accounting, and emphasizes that accounting can do no more than aid the
judgment of the business man.
5. MACNEAL, 181.
6. Id. at 143.
7. Id. at 156.
19391
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
"accounting is history, . . . the most that can be demanded of it is that it
shall be as accurate as practically possible. It is, therefore, no weakness of
the accounting mechanism that it is not well adapted to . . . modification
in so far as shifting dollar valuation is concerned."s
MacNeal seems to see all accounting problems from the point of view of
the small stockholder whom he assumes to be interested in the book value
of his security as a guide to his behavior in the market. Great emphasis is
therefore placed upon the need for current values of all assets in balance
sheets, and for profit and loss calculations which include realized and tin-
realized profits of all types. Such an attitude denies any validity to the "going-
concern" idea of an investment, and puts foolish emphasis on liquidation
values of companies that are not to be liquidated. MacNeal's reforms would
not improve the condition he speaks of in saying:
"The last thing that would occur [to an owner] would be to sell out on
the basis of the accountant's figures."9
To one who feels that the chief function of accounting is to assist business
management in making wise decisions, both authors appear too anxious to be
consistent in the application of their reforms. Of the two, however, Gilman
is by far the more acceptable. Patient readers will gain much from his pages.
MacNeal's work is too light to do more than to stimulate controversy.
It is to be regretted that neither author has filled the void so aptly described
by Gilman.
"A more promising approach might give consideration to the lawyer's
concept of profit, to the economist's concept of profit, or even to the statis-
tician's concept of profit . . .The attempt to . . .study them comparatively,
and measure the influence of each upon the accounting concept of profit,
would appear to be a task well worth while, were it not for the fact that
neither lawyers or economists seem to have agreed among themselves."10
The very fact that lawyers and economists have not agreed would make the
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